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Recognition of the potentially deleterious implications 
of inequality in opportunity originating in a skewed 
asset distribution has spawned considerable interest 
in land reforms. However, little attention has been 
devoted to fact that, in the longer term, the measures 
used to implement land reforms could negatively affect 
productivity. Use of state level data on rental restrictions, 
together with a nationally representative survey from 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the group to assess the impact of land policies on poverty and economic growth. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at kdeininger@
worldbank.org. 
India, suggests that, contrary to original intentions, rental 
restrictions negatively affect productivity and equity. The 
restrictions reduce the scope for efficiency-enhancing 
rental transactions that benefit poor producers. 
Simulations suggest that, by doubling the number of 
producers with access to land through rental, from about 
15 million currently, liberalization of rental markets 





Efficiency and equity impacts of rural land rental restrictions:  
 


















1 World Bank, Washington DC, USA 












We would like to thank A. Kaushik, T. Olsen, and S. Vats for excellent research assistance and S. Bery, D. Bradley, R. Buckley, 
E. Cook, J. Farrington, G. Feder, T. Hanstad, T. Haque, D. Lal, I. Lavadenz, K. Otsuka, S. Rozelle, two anonymous referees, and 
the editor managing this submission for insightful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the collaborative DFID-
World Bank program on land policies and rural development is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this paper are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, NCAER, or DFID.   
1. Introduction 
Researchers and policy-makers alike have come to realize that unequal access to opportunities arising 
from a skewed distribution of assets can be harmful for sustained long-term growth and thus of concern 
(Aghion et al. 1999, World Bank 2005). Not surprisingly in view of the important role and long-lasting 
impacts of historical land tenure arrangements (Banerjee and Iyer 2005), land reforms have occupied 
center stage in India’s policy debates for a long time. Following successful abolition of intermediaries 
immediately after independence, award of property rights to sitting tenants through tenancy laws and 
expropriation with subsequent transfer of ‘above-ceiling land’ from large land owners to small farmers 
were main mechanisms to improve operational and ownership distribution of land. After a slow start, 
these policies alone transferred rights to almost 10 mn ha of land, more than three times the land 
distributed in land reforms in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan together (King 1977).  
Still, despite considerable progress in the past, such legislation has almost ceased to provide new 
land access and there is growing concern that, in today’s changed context, maintaining restrictions on 
land rental could cause large efficiency losses by precluding efficiency-enhancing transfers of land to 
complement rural diversification. Given that, despite increased opportunities for rental, the share of 
Indian households participating in rental markets decreased from 26% in 1971 to 11% in 2001 and that in 
other countries rental markets have been found to significantly increase productivity (World Bank 2007), 
the impact of such restrictions could potentially be very large. This is countered by arguments that rental 
markets could, through ‘reverse’ tenancy, give rise to land concentration that is not only inefficient but 
would also disempower the poor by forcing them to offer their labor to monopsonistic landlords in local 
markets for casual labor that discriminate heavily on the basis of gender and caste.  
To assess the functioning of land rental markets and explore efficiency and equity impacts of land 
rental restrictions, we use a model of producers who differ in endowments and skills and who face 
imperfect labor markets and transaction costs -further increased by policy-induced restrictions- in the land 
market. The model would lead us to expect three distinct effects, namely (i) a factor equalization effect 
whereby land markets will transfer land to farmers with lower land and higher labor endowments and 
with a higher level of ability; (ii) a diversification effect whereby increases in the non-agricultural wage 
rate will lead to an increase in land rental activity and a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate; and (iii) a 
transaction cost effect whereby higher levels of transaction costs -which may be policy-induced- will 
increase the share of producers remaining in autarky thus reducing the number of efficiency-enhancing 
land transfers.  
  1We use a nationally representative household panel spanning the 1982 to 1999 period to 
empirically test these predictions. As land is a state subject, we use cross-state variation in land reform 
legislation and its implementation to explore impacts of rental restrictions on land market functioning and 
outcomes A panel production function is used to obtain a measure of producers’ ability to assess the 
productivity-impact of land rental. Results highlight that, contrary to what is often assumed, land rental 
markets help improve productivity and equity by transferring land to more productive and landless or 
land-poor households who, in the process, are able to improve their economic status. More importantly, 
the pro-poor nature of land markets has improved over time as wealth bias that had characterized such 
markets earlier has been eliminated. The fact that land rental is more active in locations with higher levels 
of non-farm activity supports the notion that it makes an important contribution to diversification of 
income sources in rural areas -in fact, the opportunities opened up through diversification could be a key 
factor underlying to help eliminate wealth-related barriers to rental market participation. Our analysis 
demonstrates that tenancy restrictions have not only significantly increased the share of producers who 
remain in autarky but also prevent land access by more efficient producers. In addition to the results being 
very robust, we also find that the magnitudes involved are very large. Simulations suggest that 
elimination of these restrictions could prompt an additional 40%-70% of producers to offer land for rental 
and, due to the smaller size of land rented in, double the number of those who are able to access land 
through rental. Using the mean difference between rental partners to make inferences on potential 
productivity impacts suggests that such impacts could be large as well. Thus, while implementing such 
laws has helped to obtain social gains in the past, maintaining them is an increasingly potent obstacle to 
realizing greater land access by those who are more productive and land-poor or landless and ways to 
improve on this may need to be explored.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the history of land reforms and tenancy 
regulations in rural India, reviews evidence on the impact of land rental market restrictions and key 
differences between rural and urban land markets, and uses this to lay out a conceptual model and 
empirical strategy. Section three presents the data used and reviews descriptive statistics for policy 
variables and household characteristics. Section four contains econometric results for the production 
function and different models of land rental market participation and discusses the results and their 
robustness. Section five concludes by putting results into context and drawing out policy implications.  
2. Background and conceptual framework  
Land reform policy, through abolition of intermediaries, imposition of land ceilings, and regulation of 
tenancy contracts, played a key role in India from the moment it started its independent existence. A 
review key elements of land rental and ceiling laws, their implementation, and possible links between 
  2legislation and land market outcomes is followed by a conceptual model for households’ land market 
participation and derivation of hypotheses that can be tested with the data at hand.  
2.1 Origins and nature of rural tenancy restrictions in India  
Under colonial rule, the main goal of India’s land administration system was to obtain government 
revenue. The de facto award of land rights to revenue collectors (zamindars) in large parts of the country 
has consequences that affect development to this day (Banerjee and Iyer 2005). Agrarian reform was thus 
at the top of the immediate post-independence agenda and the fact that land was put under the 
competence of states rather than the Center led to considerable diversity in the timing, substance, and 
implementation of reforms across states. Abolition of rent-collecting intermediaries was tackled swiftly 
and successfully virtually everywhere. However, ceiling legislation -aiming to legislate a maximum land 
holding and force owners to dispose of all that was owned beyond this limit- and tenancy reform -which 
had the goal of limiting the rent to be paid for land and prohibiting tenant evictions- took a long time. The 
fact that implementation started in earnest only after 1972 allowed landlords to “prepare” by resuming 
self cultivation, evicting tenants or transforming them into wage workers, or implement spurious 
subdivisions,
1 and enthusiasm for such reforms quickly disappeared after 1980 (Appu 1997). 
The existence of wide variations in legislation across states provides ample scope to analyze the 
impact of such policies on observed outcomes. However, capturing the fine differences in timing, 
applicability, modalities of implementation, and definitions inherent in such legislation appears difficult if 
not impossible. Rather than trying to do so, we use the share of households who benefited from key 
policies as an indicator for policy-induced constraints to the operation of rental markets. Specifically, we 
construct for each state the share of households who were awarded tenancy rights and the share of ceiling 
surplus area that was actually transferred to beneficiaries.
2 As none of the Indian states permit sub-leasing 
of lands to which tenants had received permanent rights and most states also impose restrictions on 
transfers of land received in the course of implementing ceiling legislation, this is proxies for direct 
restrictions on the operation of land rental markets. Both figures also provide an approximation for a state 
government’s level of implementation effort, a variable that is exogenous to households’ decisions but 
that was shown to be of great importance in earlier studies (Banerjee et al. 2002).  
                         
1 Using census figures, Appu (1997) estimates that, to avoid having to give rights to tenants, landlords evicted about 30 mn tenants or about one 
third of the total agriculturally active population. This is similar to evidence from other countries where landlords often succeeded- to evict 
tenants in anticipation of legislation to protect tenants against eviction or limit the rents they would have had to pay(Deininger 2003).  
2 We use area rather than beneficiaries because in some cases ceiling surplus land was distributed to a collective entity such as a cooperative so 
that the number of beneficiaries would be misleading. Also, the existence of large discrepancies between the amount of land expropriated and 
actually distributed -which is due to the fact that in some cases land that had been distributed could not occupied by beneficiaries or was taken 
back after some time- led us to focus on land actually distributed.  
  3Table 1 presents summary statistics by state for total agricultural area and 1980 population 
(columns 1 and 2) and our measures of land reform implementation around 1980 (columns 3 and 4).
3 
Relative emphasis across types of intervention, and the extent of implementation vary across states. More 
than 10% of households received tenancy rights in Kerala, Gujarat, West Bengal, and Maharashtra and 
more than 5% of area was distributed under ceiling surplus legislation in West Bengal, Andhra, 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and UP. Some states (e.g. West Bengal, Maharashtra) heavily relied on both 
measures, others (e.g. Andhra, Rajasthan and UP) focused exclusively on ceiling surplus, and some (e.g. 
Kerala and Gujarat) emphasized tenancy laws. Although -without detailed knowledge on content and 
implementation effort- the number of tenancy laws enacted is at best an imperfect proxy for the number 
and severity of restrictions on land rental, it is a useful point of reference. We thus include in the mean 
number of tenancy laws in each state (column 5) from Besley and Burgess (2000). One notes that the 
mean number of laws at any point amounts to 1.5, from none in Haryana to more than 4 in Tamil Nadu. 
The correlation between the number of laws and the number of tenants who received rights is low (ρ = 
0.28), supporting the notion that legal provisions alone had limited impact and implementation effort was 
required.  
While we do not separate it out in the table, a more detailed look at the time dimension of these 
measures allows a number of conclusions (Kaushik 2005). First, land reform has been a major effort; up 
to 2000, land reform laws resulted in the transfer of almost 10 mn ha, 2.5 mn ha under programs to 
redistribute of ceiling surplus land and 7.35 mn ha under tenancy legislation.
4 Second, after a spurt of 
land transfers in the 1970s and 1980s, progress has slowed down considerably; in fact between 1995/96 
and 2003/04, i.e. for almost a decade, progress in awarding land rights to tenants had come to a complete 
standstill.
5  
2.2 Tenancy legislation and rent controls: International evidence 
Even though empirical evidence on the impact of rent ceilings and other forms of tenancy control in rural 
areas is limited, the issue has been analyzed in urban contexts where rent control is a textbook example 
for policies that can be effective to transfer resources in the short term but will be associated with 
inefficiencies in the medium to long run (Arnott 2003). The key reason, which also formed the basis for 
analytical approaches, is that, by fixing rents below their equilibrium level, controls reduce the supply of 
                         
3 Wherever available, the level of the respective variables in 1980 and 1998, respectively, is used as a right hand side variable in the regressions.  
4 The amount of land involved is much larger than what was redistributed in other Asian land reforms such as Japan (2 mn has), Korea (0.58 mn 
has) and Taiwan (0.24 mn has). In terms of total area distributed, this puts India on par with Mexico which, in a much more land-abundant 
setting, and starting in 1917, managed to distribute slightly more than 13 mn ha (Deininger 2003).  
5 The increment in ceiling surplus land transferred during the period amounted to only 10,800 ha which is only about one tenth of the land 
declared ceiling surplus which had not been distributed. The fact that all the remainder remains tied up in litigation suggests that further progress 
in achieving redistribution of ceiling land could be slow -it would take almost 90 years to dispose of remaining ceiling surplus cases if the current 
pace is maintained- and that, by clogging up the court system and preventing it from quickly dispensing justice in other urgent matters, the ceiling 
legislation may impose external effects beyond land rental markets (Moog 1997).  
  4new housing or maintenance of existing units by landlords who face an artificially reduced price 
(Gyourko and Linneman 1990). Thus, although they transfer resources from landlords to sitting tenants at 
the time of imposition, they make access to rental property more difficult thereafter (Basu and Emerson 
2000). With a constant or decreasing number of beneficiaries and an increasing number of new entrants 
who need to access to land in distorted markets, social cost of maintaining land rental restrictions will 
increase over time (Glaeser 2002). While rent controls may be useful to deal with emergencies in the 
short term, other policies may be more effective (Malpezzi and Ball 1991), have fewer undesirable side-
effects including reduced tenant mobility (Munch and Svarer 2002), and can be better targeted.  
While there is little empirical evidence on the impact of rental restrictions in rural areas, a number 
of reasons would lead one to expect that it will go far beyond the price effects on which the urban 
literature has focused. First, due to labor market imperfections, the way in which rural land is used will 
have a clear impact on productive efficiency (Binswanger et al. 1995). Second, supply of housing to 
urban markets will be less elastic as owners can not revert to own- or wage labor-based cultivation, an 
issue that has been highly relevant in India (Appu 1997). Third, as rural rents are generally defined as an 
in-kind output share, contract terms will be less flexible than urban ones, limiting the scope for 
circumventing them by adjusting rental rates (Basu and Emerson 2003). Finally, rights given to tenants 
are heritable but non-transferable and still require rent payment to the landlord, thus reducing both 
parties’ incentives for land-related investments and the scope to increase allocative efficiency through 
sub-leasing.
6  
While all of these issues could significantly add to the long-term cost of land reforms, they have 
not featured prominently in the large literature on Indian land reforms (Warriner 1969, Thorner 1976, 
Besley and Burgess 2000, Banerjee et al. 2002). Exploring this by assessing how land rental markets 
work and to what extent they are affected by tenancy restrictions will allow us to get an indication of such 
cost and help put the policy debate on land markets in India on a more robust empirical footing.  
2.3 Conceptual framework  
A key rationale for producers to engage in land markets is the desire to adjust for differences in their 
existing endowments of land and family labor. Following similar models in the literature (Carter and Yao 
2002), let household i be endowed with fixed amounts of labor ( i L ) and land ( i A ), and a given level of 
agricultural ability ( i α ). Agricultural production follows a production function f(αi,,li,a,Ai) with standard 
                         
6 The tenant will be unlikely to invest as doing so will result in an immediate increase of the rent whereas investment by the landlord is unlikely 
as part of the benefits will go to the tenant.  
  5properties, i.e. f’>0, f’’<0 with respect to all arguments and f’’lA>0.
7 Relative land scarcity, together with 
the cost of supervising labor (Frisvold 1994) makes wage-labor based cultivation undesirable in 
equilibrium (Binswanger et al. 1995), implying that households allocate their labor endowment between 
farming their own land (li,a) and off-farm employment (li,o) at an exogenous wage ( ). Renting of land 
incurs transaction costs TC
i w
in for renting-in and TC
out  for renting-out because of the need to obtain 
information on market conditions, to negotiate and enforce payments, and the presence of regulations that 
restrict transferability or completely outlaw certain contract types. We assume transaction costs to be 
proportional to the size of land transferred allow households to structure rental contracts in a way that 
allows those lacking liquidity to enter into arrangements to allow them to defer rental payments until the 
harvest. With this, household i’s decision problem is to choose Ai, li,a and li,o to solve  
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s.t.     li,a+li,o≤ L          ( 1 a )  
  li,a, li,o, Ai ≥  0          (1b) 
where p is the price of agricultural goods, r is the rental rate, Ai is the operational land size, 
in I is a 
indicator variable for rent-in (=1 for rent-in, 0 otherwise), 
out I  is an indicator for rent-out (=1 for rent-
out, and 0 otherwise), TC
in and TC
out are transaction costs, and all other variables are as defined above. 
Assuming that the restrictions in (1a) hold with equality, the optimal choices of li,a
*, li,o
* and Ai
* will solve 
the first order conditions (FOC) of problem (1), i.e. 
       w A l pf i a i i a li = ) , , ( , , α     (2)   
and for households who rent in (A
* >  i A ),      (3) 
in
i a i i A TC r A l pf
i + = ) , , ( , α
and for households who rent out (A
* <  i A ),    (4) 
out
i a i i A TC r A l pf
i − = ) , , ( , α
and for autarkic households (A
* =  i A ),      (5) 
in
i a i i i A
out TC r A l pf TC r + < < − ) , , ( , α
The first order conditions allow derivation of three empirically testable propositions as follows with more 
detailed proofs to be found in the appendix. 
                         
7 Note that, f(αi,,li,a,Ai) is subject to constant return to scale. For example, in the Cobb-Douglass case,  . As ability 
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β β
i a i i a i A l A l f =
  6Proposition 1: The amount of land rented in (out) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in 
households’ agricultural ability, αi, and strictly decreasing (increasing) in the land endowment  i A . Land 
rental will transfer land to efficient, but land-poor producers, thereby contributing to higher levels of 
productivity and more efficient factor use in the economy. For households renting in or out land, this 
proposition can be derived by totally differentiating both sides of equations (2) and (3) or (2) and (4) with 
respect to αi or  i A . Manipulating terms yields ∂Ai
*/∂αi >0 (or ∂Ai
*/∂ A  <0). Since ai
in or ai
out, the amount 
rented in or rented out, respectively is defined as either Ai
*- i A  or  i A -Ai




Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs defines two critical ability levels αl(TC
out, ..) and 
αu(TC
in, ..) such that households with ability αi∈[αl, αu] will remain in autarky. Any increase in TC
in or 
TC
out will expand the autarky range, thus reducing the number of producers participating in rental markets 
and the number of efficiency-enhancing land transactions. Compared to a situation with no transaction 
cost, this will decrease productivity and social welfare. To see this, note that the cutoff points αl and αu 
can be obtained from (4) and (3) by setting Ai*= i A  and li,a=  where   is autarkic household i’s 
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u . Differentiation of αl or αu with respect to the corresponding transaction cost 
variable TC
out or TC
in then yields the result of interest.  
Proposition 3: Increases of the exogenously given wage for off-farm employment will imply that 
higher amounts of land are transacted in rental markets as households with low agricultural ability who 
join the off-farm labor market will supply more land. This leads to a decrease in the equilibrium rental 
rate which will prompt high-ability workers (specializing in agricultural production) to rent in more land.  
To derive this proposition, assume without loss of generality that the economy contains n 
households who are endowed with identical amounts of land and labor  A  and L  but different levels of 
farming ability αi and that the latter is uniformly distributed between α  and α . We also assume that, with 
fixed setup costs, households give up agricultural production completely and rent out all their land if the 
amount of labor to be allocated optimally to agricultural production is less than la
c. To be able to derive a 
closed form solution, we abstract from transaction costs (i.e. letting TC
in=TC
out=0) and use an explicit 
  7functional form  . With an exogenous wage w and prices normalized to 1, the 
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c allows to solve for the critical level of ability αc below which households will rent out all 
their land endowment. For households who continue farm production, we solve for the new optimal 
operational land size (A
**) and new rental rate (r






A n d A
* * ). Setting A A =
* * allows us to solve for the farming ability by household who 
remain autarkic  αau. Taking derivatives of αc, A
**,  αau and r
** with respect to w yields: ∂αc/∂w>0, 
∂A
**/∂w>0,  ∂αau/∂w<0 and ∂r
**/∂w<0, suggesting that, as off-farm opportunities increase, a larger 
number of households will drop farm production and rent out all their endowment, the equilibrium rental 
rate will decrease, households who remain in agricultural production cultivate more land, and a greater 
number of households will rent in land. 
2.4 Estimation strategy  
Equations (2)-(5) indicate that producers’ decision to enter land rental markets depends on their marginal 
productivity in autarky, MP( A ) as compared to the rental rate to be paid r
in(T) or received r
out(T) which 
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    (8) 
A producer’s marginal product MP( A ), will depend on his or her ability (α), endowment with land ( A ), 
family labor (L ), assets (K), and the opportunity cost of labor which will be affected by the level of 
education (E) and the presence of opportunities in the local off-farm labor market (O). Defining a well-
  8behaved net earning function g(α, A  ,L ,K,E,O) with first derivative g’(.),we can write a linear version of 
the latter as MP( A )=g’(α,  A ,  L ,K,E,O)= β0 + β1α + β2 A  + β3L  + β4K + β5E + β6O. Transaction 
costs are expected to depend on policy variables S, household characteristics Z, and a time dummy D
99. 
Defining an index variable yi such that yi = 1 if A*<  A ; yi = 2 if A*=  A ; yi = 3 if A*>  A , we can 
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Variables we expect to affect marginal productivity are agricultural ability (α), the derivation of 
which will be discussed below, a dummy for landlessness and the log of the land endowment to represent 
A , the number of members in the 14-60 and below 14-year age group to represent L , the value of assets 
and the share of agricultural assets (livestock, implements, and agricultural structures) for K, the head’s 
age (as a proxy for experience) and a dummy for primary education to represent human capital E, and 
mean village income O to represent wage labor opportunities in off-farm labor markets. Transaction cost 
of land rental participation are affected by producer’s caste status, (Z), a time dummy (D
99), and land 
policy (S) which is proxied by either the share of households who were recognized under tenancy reform, 
the share of area distributed under ceiling legislation, or the number of tenancy laws enacted as discussed 
earlier.  
The propositions from our model allow making predictions on the signs of individual coefficients. 
The factor equalization from proposition 1 implies that rental markets will transfer land to more 
productive producers (β1>0) with lower levels of land endowments (β2<0) and more family labor (β3>0). 
The hypothesis of wealth bias in rental markets, possibly due to credit market imperfections, translates 
into β4>0. Diversification effects implied by proposition 3 suggest that producers with higher levels of 
education have better off farm opportunities and will be less likely to rent in land (β5<0) and that higher 
levels of non-agricultural wages, proxied by O, will make renting in less likely (β6<0).  
Proposition 2 implies that, by moving the cut-off points where producers shift from renting out to 
autarky and from autarky to renting in, respectively, rental market restrictions expand the range of autarky 
but do not affect producers’ marginal product.
8 We thus expect η1>0 and δ1<0, respectively. By the same 
logic, higher transaction costs for producers from scheduled and backward castes imply η2>0, and δ2<0 
                         
8 It is intuitive that rental restrictions will directly affect whether or not households participate but, unless there are selectivity issue, are unlikely 
to affect producers’ marginal productivity. Indeed testing for selectivity of rental market participation, by including rental restrictions in the 
marginal product equation as well, does not produce conclusive results.  
  9while a reduction over time in transaction costs due to better access to information implies η3<0 and 
δ3>0. 
A key element of the regression (8) is households’ agricultural ability α. As the data available are 
a panel of households and their offspring who were observed in 1982 and again in 1999, we can recover 
this parameter from a panel production function using household (or dynasty) fixed effects to proxy for 
ability (Deininger and Jin 2007). Let technology be represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function 
) exp( ) exp(
4 3 2 1 t X K L A Q ijt ijt ijt ijt j i ijt φ α α
θ θ θ θ + =        (10) 
where Qijt is the value of agricultural output produced by household i in village j in year t; Aijt, Lijt and Kijt, 
Xijt are total cultivated area, labor for crop production, value of agricultural assets, and amounts of 
chemical fertilizer, organic manure, pesticides, and seeds, θ1, θ2, θ3, and θ4 are technical coefficients, αj is 
a time invariant village level parameter reflecting, among others, access to markets, infrastructure, and 
other time invariant factors such as climate, αi is the time invariant household fixed effect which we use 
to measure of ability, and t is a time dummy so that exp(φt) measures productivity changes over time. To 
estimate this, we let αij = αi +αj, take logarithms of both sides, and add an iid error term to obtain  
qijt = αij +θ1aijt + θ2 lijt + θ3 kijt + θ4 xijt + φt + εijt     (11) 
where lower case letters are logarithms. With multiple observations per household, we can subtract means  
qijt - ij q  = αij -  j i α  + θ (Zijt - ij Z ) + φ (t-t ) + εijt -  j i ε      (12) 
where Zijt is a vector including a, l, k, x with coefficients θ . As αij -  j i α  = 0, this can be simplified to  
qijt - ij q  = θ (Zijt - ij Z ) + φ (t-t ) + εijt -  j i ε       (13) 
This can be used to obtain  , composed of a producer’s idiosyncratic ability α ij α ˆ i and unobserved 
village attributes  αj. Letting the latter be the average of household fixed effect in the village 
 (Mundlak 1961) allows to obtain  ∑ =
i
j ij j n / ) ˆ ( ˆ α α i α ˆ , the producer-specific effect by subtracting  j α ˆ from 
ij α ˆ .
9  
3. Data sources and descriptive evidence 
                         
9 An alternative approach is to use a stochastic frontier production function to determine producers’ level of technical efficiency in each of the 
periods. This assumes that the disturbance term is composed of two additive components vi and ui where vi is pure white noise and ui~N
+(0, δu
2) 
captures producers’ level of technical inefficiency TEi = exp(-ui) (Coelli 1995). While the strong distributional assumption and the fact that ui 
captures other shocks imply that this is inferior to the panel approach, the fact that a large number of households dropped out of the panel makes 
this an attractive alternative which we use as a robustness check for our results below. 
  10Before discussing the econometric results, we describe the data by presenting evidence on socio-
economic characteristics as well as land market participation and changes in these variables over time. 
This allows us to explore changes of the economic structure, growth, and asset accumulation by 
individuals and at the village level. Concerning rental markets, our interest is to find out whether our 
hypotheses are supported by descriptive evidence or whether, possibly as a result of “reverse tenancy” 
rental markets lead to transfers from small to larger producers rather than to land-poor ones.  
3.1 Household characteristics  
The data used in the analysis come from two rounds of NCAER’s ARIS/REDS survey conducted in 1982 
and 1999, respectively. This survey, the first rounds of which were implemented in 1968-71 to evaluate 
the impact of an agricultural development program, covers all of India’s major states. Even though the 
first round sample, stratified by farm size and wealth class, was limited to project areas, the survey was 
expanded in 1982 to make it more representative at the national level, covering slightly less than 5,000 
households (Foster and Rosenzweig 1996). The 1999 sample contains the 1982 sample and replacements 
for those no longer present. If the original household had split, all of the households belonging to the 
same dynasty in the original village plus a sub-sample of successor households outside the village were 
interviewed, bringing the total to about 7,500 households (Foster and Rosenzweig 2004).  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the whole country and its four main regions in both 
periods.
10 We note that there has been a marked increase in educational attainment, as illustrated by the 
fact that the share of household heads with primary schooling completed increased from about 26% in 
1982 to 50% in 1999. The gap that had earlier separated Northern and Southern states also narrowed 
considerably. At the same time, population growth led to a decline in the average land endowment, from 
3.3 ha in 1982 to 2.1 ha in 1999, and a small increase in landlessness, from 22% to 24%. Average 
household size decreased, from 6.9 to 6.0, with about 4 in the 14 to 60 age category, 0.4 aged above 60, 
and 2.4 as compared to 1.8 below the age of 14. The share of female headed households is, with 6.8%, 
almost the same in both periods, although female headship is more pronounced in the South than in other 
regions.  
Survey results also point towards an annual increase of per capita income of 3.1% during the 
period under concern. This aggregate masks pronounced differences across regions with the South having 
caught up and even replaced the North as the region with the highest income in the second period. Use of 
the information from the listing exercise allows us to compute the Gini coefficient for self-assessed 
income in a way that includes all households in the sampled villages. With a Gini coefficient of 0.32 in 
                         
10 We group states into four regions as follows: The North includes the states of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh; the West 
includes Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan; the East includes Assam, Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal; and the South includes 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.  
  11the first and 0.31 in the second period, inequalities in income remain modest and have not appreciably 
increased between the two periods. The overall improvement in living standards as illustrated by 
increased income is mirrored by a significant rise in asset values of approximately 6% per year.
11 It is 
worth noting that, with a Gini coefficient of 0.60 in 1982, inequality in assets is higher than income 
inequality, as found in other parts in the world as well. However, this coefficient has actually decreased to 
0.56 in the second period. While overall asset endowments have increased, the broad composition of 
households’ asset portfolio shows greater stability; the house and consumption durables make up the 
largest share in both periods (57.5% and 56.9%, respectively in 1982 and 1999), followed by financial 
and off-farm assets (26.7% and 23.2%), and farm assets including livestock (15.8% and 19.9%).  
The bottom panel illustrates the diversification of income sources achieved during the period by 
highlighting the share of households who participated in various activities, noting that households 
generally rely on more than just one income source. Three observations are of particular interest. First, 
despite a drop by about 7 and 15 percentage points in the share of households engaging in crop and 
livestock production, respectively (from 70% to 63% for crop and from 78% to 63% for livestock), self 
employment in agriculture remains the most important source of employment in India’s rural economy. 
The fact that this is followed by agricultural wage employment, the share of which has actually increased 
over the period (from 37.6% to 43.3%) points to a continued importance of agriculture and the importance 
of agricultural wage employment for the landless. A second finding of interest is that the share of 
households engaging in self-employment in rural India has been more or less constant, implying that 
growth of the rural non-farm sector has been just large enough to absorb population growth. This 
contrasts with other countries where the rural non-farm economy developed as a result of out-migration of 
labor or due to households taking up non-farm self employment. In fact, according to our data, the main 
source of income diversification was growth of non-farm wage employment, participation in which 
increased from 8.6% in 1982 to 20% in 1999. This fact, which has also been observed elsewhere (Foster 
and Rosenzweig 2004), could result from the government’s emphasis on creating rural employment 
through mechanisms ranging from direct subsidies for firms to set up in remote areas to industrial and 
labor market regulation such as small scale reservation acts (Besley and Burgess 2004).  
3.2 Operation of land rental markets  
To provide evidence on the extent to which our hypotheses on land markets are borne out descriptively, 
Table 3 presents key variables by households’ land rental participation status (rent in, rent out, or 
autarky). It points towards a large increase in the level of land market activity over the period; from 5.3% 
                         
11 While part of this increase may be due to improvements in the survey instrument that resulted in better measurement of assets in the second 
period, it is impossible to test this hypothesis as disaggregated data for 1982 were not available.  
  12and 2% for renting out and renting in, respectively, in 1982, the share of market participants has increased 
to 10.7% and 4.1%, in 1999.
12 Descriptive figures also support the propositions from our model and the 
notion of better rental market functioning in the second, as compared to the first period.  
Comparing the per capita land endowment for land owners who either remained in autarky (0.51 
ha and 0.36 ha in 1982 and 1999, respectively), rented in (0.28 ha and 0.20 ha), or rented out (0.68 ha and 
0.64 ha) in the two periods illustrates that, in both periods, rental provided opportunities for relatively 
land-scarce and labor-abundant households to gain access to land. Land markets transferred land from 
households with more educated and female heads to male headed ones with lower educational attainment. 
We also note that the share of landless who had gained access to land through rental markets increased 
from 12% in the first to 37% in the second period, suggesting a marked expansion of outreach towards 
this group over time. Noting that our sample represents about 130 mn rural households, in 1999 about 15 
mn households -a quarter of them landless- were able to use markets as a means to get access to land. 
This figure is not only much larger than the number of those who got access to land through land reform 
but also that, given the magnitudes involved, even policies with “modest” impact on the functioning of 
land rental markets could have implications for a large number of households.  
Comparing levels of consumption and assets for households who differ in the nature of their land 
market participation reinforces the notion that rental provides opportunities for poor segments of the 
population to access productive resources and thereby improve their well-being, especially in the second 
period. The value of all assets owned by rent-in households in 1999 is, with Rs. 33,839, more than 25% 
below the average, compared to asset ownership that is similar to the mean for autarkic households and 
about 33% higher than the mean for those renting out, supporting the notion that it is the asset-poor who 
benefit from the access to land which rental markets provide. The narrowing of the gap between rent-in 
and average households with respect to per capita expenditure supports the hypothesis of land markets 
making a positive contribution to the livelihood of participants. Finding significant differences in the 
composition of the asset portfolio between rent-in and rent-out households, with the former having 
relatively more of their wealth in farming and livestock and the latter in off-farm and financial assets is 
not too surprising.  
While higher participation in crop and livestock production by those renting in should not come 
as a surprise, the high share of renters engaging in (agricultural) wage employment suggests that land 
rental provides wage laborers with opportunities to earn additional income. At the same time, the fact that 
                         
12 While this is a large change, the level of rental market activity increased more rapidly, and in a shorter period, in other Asian countries such as 
China or Vietnam, despite the fact that the more egalitarian land ownership distribution in these countries would put greater limits on the 
potential of land markets to equalize operational holdings than in India. In Vietnam, the share of households renting in increased form 3.8% to 
15.8% in the 5-year period between 1993 and 1998 (Deininger and Jin 2007). In China, the same figure increased from 2.3% in 1996 to 9.4 in 
2001 (Deininger and Jin 2005).  
  13-in contrast to what was found in 1982- non-farm self employment is much higher among rent-in 
households than either the mean or those who remained in autarky suggests that land rental is not an 
obstacle to participation in the rural non-farm economy. To the contrary, renting may provide an 
opportunity to accumulate experience and capital to replace the “agricultural ladder” (Spillman 1919) 
with a general increase in occupational mobility including the non-farm sector (Alston and Ferrie 2005).  
4. Econometric evidence  
We find that measures to implement land reform, whether proxied by the number of laws passed, the area 
transferred under ceiling legislation, or the number of beneficiaries from tenancy acts, constrain rental 
market activity, thereby reducing both equity and efficiency. They make it more difficult for producers 
with high ability, including the landless, to gain access to land while at the same time constituting an 
obstacle for giving up farming by those with low ability who want to get out of agriculture.  
4.1 Production function  
To obtain a measure of households’ or dynasties’ agricultural ability, a production function, coefficients 
for which are reported in Table 4, was estimated. Although a significant number of households for whom 
production is observed only in one of the periods are dropped, the specification fit the data very well with 
an R
2 of 0.76 for the fixed effect estimation, and of 0.83 for OLS with coefficient estimates from both 
being close to each other. Concerning the individual variables, land is estimated to be by far the most 
important input to crop production; doubling cultivated land area alone would lead to a 50% to 58% 
increase in total crop production. This is followed by seed expenditures and labor use with an estimated 
elasticity of 13% to 17% each. Compared to these, returns to fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation and assets are 
more moderate with elasticities of about 5%, 2-3%, 1-2%, and 4% for expenditure on fertilizer, pesticides, 
irrigation and others. While neither education nor the gender of the household head are significant, land 
quality matters and doubling land values, which we use as a proxy for land quality, would increase total 
output by 11-12%. Significant variation of ability across households could imply that, even without a 
strong pull from non-agricultural employment opportunities, the scope for market-mediated transfers to 
bring about efficiency gains could be large. The estimated size of technological change between the two 
periods is between 14 and 24%.
13  
4.2 Determinants of land market participation  
                         
13 The fact that coefficients for the frontier production function are very similar to those obtained using OLS and the panel increases our 
confidence in the robustness of the results. 
  14Results from ordered probit estimation of the rental market participation equation using the pooled sample 
for 1982 and 1999 are reported in Table 5.
14 The three pairs of columns correspond to our policy 
variables, i.e. recognition of tenants, distribution of ceiling land, and tenancy laws passed. To interpret 
them, recall the coding of 1 for the rent-out, 2 for the autarky, and 3 for the rent-in regime, implying that a 
positive coefficient will increase the probability of renting out. As ability is defined only for households 
or dynasties who engaged in agricultural production in both periods, inclusion of this variable reduces the 
sample and we also report regressions without ability in columns 1, 3 and 5.  
The highly significant coefficient on ability implies that, in line with expectations, rental markets 
improve productivity of land use by transferring land from less to more efficient producers. The implied 
magnitude is large; according to the estimates, the probability for the most efficient household in the 
sample to rent in is more than double that for the average household as is the probability of renting out for 
the least efficient producer in the sample. While lack of data on profits before and after rental 
participation makes it difficult to assess the net impact on productivity, evidence from China, where rental 
helped increase productivity gains by some 60% (Deininger and Jin 2006), suggest that these can be large.  
We also find strong factor equalization effects. Higher endowments with land and limited access 
to family labor, especially in the 14-60 year age group, are estimated to increase the propensity to supply 
land to the rental market, supporting the notion that, by transferring land to labor-rich but land-poor 
households, markets provide scope for gainful employment of rural labor. Significance and magnitude of 
the coefficient on the landless dummy suggest that rental is an important avenue for landless households 
to access land. To interpret the coefficients, note that, at 5.4 to 8.6 percentage points above that for a land 
owning household, landless producer’s propensity to access land through rental is almost double that of 
the former. The notion of land rental markets being biased in favor of the wealthy is further undermined 
by the lack of significance for the coefficient on total assets.
15  
A strong diversification effect also emerges. The head having completed at least primary 
education increases the propensity to rent out land, e.g. because more educated individuals have more 
opportunities outside of agriculture. At mean values of the other variables, the probability to rent out (rent 
in) land for a household whose head attained primary education or above is 2.1% higher (1.1% lower) 
than one without primary education. Mean village income similarly increases the tendency to rent out,
16 
implying that as, with overall development, the level of income increases, households will be more likely 
to move out of agriculture, supply land to the rental market, and allow those with higher ability to 
                         
14 As, in most states, land reform implementation was essentially completed by 1982, implementation effort after 1982 is not a good measure for 
states’ seriousness in implementing land reform. The fact that this measure would disproportionately reward ‘latecomer’ states, together with the 
challenging econometric nature of fixed effect ordered probit estimation, leads us to use the pooled sample throughout for our estimations. 
15 Inclusion of an interaction between the time dummy and asset ownership (not reported) suggests that land rental markets had been biased in 
favor of the wealthy in 1982 but that, presumably due to better credit market access in the study areas, this bias had disappeared by 1999.  
16 The coefficient on mean village income loses significance if ability is included, presumably due to the much lower number of observations.  
  15increase their holdings and income levels. This phenomenon, which has also been observed in China, 
highlights the importance of rental markets with economic development and suggests that imposing 
restrictions on the operation of such markets could not only inflict efficiency losses but also become more 
difficult over time.  
Regarding the lower bound equation, regressions suggest that policy restrictions will lead to a 
significant and quantitatively large reduction of land supply to rental markets. Estimated effects are 
weakest for the number of laws (columns 5 and 6) and strongest for recognition of tenants (col. 1 and 2), 
consistent with the notion that implementation is more important than mere legislation and that landlords 
will be less willing to rent out if doing so can attenuate their property rights or if there are limits on their 
ability to negotiate the amount of rent.
17 The share of land affected by redistribution of ceiling land is in 
the middle between these two, consistent with expectations that ceiling legislation poses less of a threat 
than tenancy regulation -as the latter applies to all market participants irrespective of their holding size- 
and enforcing it is more politically controversial and administratively complex than implementing 
tenancy legislation. Coefficients on other variables suggest that, even after adjusting for policies, 
scheduled and backward castes are less likely to rent out land than the remainder of the population, 
possibly due to lower levels of social capital and less opportunity to find partners in rental markets or to 
enforce protection of property rights for rented land. The highly significant and positive coefficient on the 
1999 dummy illustrates that, over time, land rental supply increased significantly, possibly due to 
information access. To quantify the impact of policy restrictions we compute, for every household, the 
predicted probability to rent out with actual values for all right hand side variables and with the tenancy 
restriction variable taking a value of zero. Taking the difference between these two values as a measure 
for the impact of tenancy restrictions suggests that their removal could lead to a considerable increase in 
renting out, by between 40% and 70%.  
Turning to the (upper) bound between autarky and renting in, the positive coefficient on all the 
policy variables suggests that over and above the reduction in supply they also depressed demand, making 
it more difficult for households to obtain land through rental. Across policy variables, those relating to the 
intensity of enforcement are again more significant; in fact the number of laws, while of the expected 
sign, is not different from zero at conventional levels. In most equations, coefficients are bigger for the 
upper as compared to the lower bound, suggesting that the impact of policy-induced restrictions will be 
larger on the demand side. Applying the methodology used earlier for the lower bound to assess predicted 
impacts of eliminating policy restrictions suggests that, with a coefficient much larger than for the upper 
bound, removal of tenancy restriction could double participation rates by rent-in households.  
                         
17 Note that the coefficients on the number of laws and the amount of land distributed via ceiling laws lose significance in the smaller sample. 
  16Consistent with what emerged for the upper bound, we also find that backward and scheduled 
castes are more likely to remain in autarky and that over time, the size of the autarky area has decreased, 
i.e. land rental markets have become more active. While this is encouraging sign and suggests that time 
may partly offset undesirable impacts of rental regulation, the magnitude of the coefficients is small; 
estimated coefficients imply that almost a century will be required to fully offset these effects. Together 
with case studies suggesting that circumventing such legislation is easier for the rich than for the poor 
(Yugandhar 1996, Thangaraj 2004), this implies that passage of time is unlikely to eliminate the negative 
effects of tenancy regulation or do so in an equitable manner. To test the robustness of our conclusions, 
we compare results those derived from using the productivity measure derived from the frontier 
production function instead of the panel. Doing so increases the sample size by two thirds but leads to 
very similar substantive conclusions; in particular providing strong support to the factor equalization and 
diversification effects as well as the negative impact of policy restrictions (Appendix Table 1).  
4.3 Efficiency impact of land rental restrictions  
Results thus far highlight that policy restrictions negatively affected efficiency by reducing overall rental 
market and impeding access to land by the poor. Interacting policy variables with producers’ estimated 
productive efficiency allows more detailed exploration of rental restrictions’ impact on efficiency. Results 
from doing so, with three columns again representing three types of policy variables, are reported in Table 
6 where main equation coefficients are very consistent with those reported in Table 5. The positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction with tenancy and ceiling implementation in the upper bound 
equation (bottom panel) suggests that land rental restrictions have prevented land access by the most 
efficient producers.  
  One explanation consistent with this is that sitting tenants who already own land but are not 
necessarily the most efficient benefit from tenancy regulation at the cost of more productive and land-
poor producers who are constrained by tenancy restrictions and unable to effectively express their demand 
in the market.
18 Thus even if they had positive distributional effects, land rental restrictions would be 
difficult to justify as it should be possible to use the productivity gains form their elimination to 
compensate losers. The fact that, according to our analysis, this is not the case implies that an elimination 
of such restrictions would benefit everybody. The fact that there are likely to be further dynamic 
inefficiencies as the negative productivity effects from rental restrictions will accumulate over time -for 
example with generational shift, e.g. if children do not want to continue in farming as in the case of the 
Philippines (Deininger et al. 2002)- makes the case for their removal more compelling.  
                         
18 The fact that interactions remain insignificant throughout in the lower bound equation –with the policy variables even losing significance for 
ceiling land redistribution- is not unexpected as the data do not allow us to obtain a measure of productive efficiency for all producers who rent 
out all their land in the second period. 
  175. Conclusion  
In rural India, there is an increasing recognition of the importance of land rental markets to bring land to 
more productive uses while at the same time providing a basis for development of the rural non-farm 
economy. Although the continued need for restrictions on the operation of land rental markets has been 
debated at an abstract level in numerous case studies, quantitative evidence of its impact has been scant, 
giving rise to a debate that is highly ideological in nature. Use of a national sample, jointly with cross-
state variation in tenancy legislation, allows us to provide evidence on the impact of rental markets in 
general and restrictions on the operation of such markets in particular.  
Contrary to what is often assumed, our data suggest that, by allowing higher ability individuals to 
access land and equalizing factor ratios, rental markets improve productivity and equity. The level of 
activity has increased significantly over time and wealth bias that had characterized such markets earlier 
evaporated as the economy has diversified. While land markets make an essential contribution to the 
emergence of the non-agricultural economy, rental restrictions limit the level of market activity and the 
ability of the most productive producers to access more land, thus reducing overall welfare. These results, 
which are in line with case study evidence from a number of states (Hanstad et al. 2006), highlight the 
importance of taking action on eliminating rental market restrictions, as articulated in the government’s 
10
th 5-year plan (Government of India 2002) and reiterated even more forcefully in the documents 
circulated in preparation for the 11
th plan.
19 Moreover, our results will also be of great relevance for 
neighboring countries, many of which have equally restrictive land rental policies that are likely to have 
similar impacts.  
 
                         
19 “…freedom in leasing of land, both 'leasing in' and 'leasing out' will help generate income for both lessee and lessor/contractor. A legislation 
needs to be enacted to facilitate the land utilisation by making land transactions easier and facilitating leasing and contract farming.” 
(Government of India 2002, p. 528). Note that political resistance to abolition of tenancy restrictions can likely be minimized by taking sitting 
tenants’ welfare into account and by proceeding in a stepwise manner, starting with states characterized by high agricultural potential, and by 
carefully documenting the results from doing so.  























Andra Pradesh  17.11  75.73  0.75%  8.34%  0.53 
Bihar   22.22  82.88  0.00%  4.42%  2.64 
Gujarat 8.44  50.60  11.20%  1.95%  1.47 
Haryana 10.60  21.08  0.01%  1.26%  0.00 
Himachal Pradesh  2.08  6.08  3.19%  0.06%  n.a. 
Karnataka 18.79  52.73  5.29%  1.71%  1.42 
Kerala 0.94  31.84  12.49%  1.30%  2.42 
Madhya Pradesh  43.75  60.39  0.61%  2.69%  0.94 
Maharashtra 33.54  96.75  10.68%  7.74%  0.97 
Orissa 13.54  36.71  1.43%  2.24%  1.94 
Punjab   15.45  24.29  0.04%  1.50%  0.58 
Rajasthan 27.04  56.47  0.16%  6.63%  0.00 
Tamil Nadu  10.12  62.11  3.23%  2.47%  4.03 
Uttar Pradesh  51.17  166.05  0.00%  5.81%  1.42 
West Bengal  16.98  80.22 10.80%  14.91%  3.83 
All India  298.77  930.57  5.35%  4.41%  1.49 
Source: Kaushik (2005), based on annual reports by the Ministry of Rural Development for columns 1-4; Besley and Burgess 
(2000) for column 5.  
 
  19Table 2: Key household characteristics by region and time  
 1982  1999 
  All  North West  East South  All   North West  East South 
Basic characteristics 
Household  size  6.86 7.20 7.28 6.97 6.01 6.02 6.64 6.10 6.30 5.21 
Members aged below 14  2.36  2.58  2.61 2.36 1.87 1.86 2.15 2.02 1.93 1.36 
Members aged 14 – 60  4.16  4.22  4.35 4.28 3.83 3.75 4.01 3.68 4.02 3.44 
Members older than 60  0.34  0.41  0.32 0.33 0.32 0.41 0.48 0.40 0.36 0.41 
Head's  age  50.10 51.52 49.59 48.89 49.96 49.20 49.45 48.55 48.43 50.30 
Female head dummy (%)  6.86  4.14  4.39 4.63  13.29  6.66 4.28 5.14 4.65  11.89 
Head with primary or above.  0.26  0.22 0.17 0.26 0.40 0.50 0.56 0.42 0.54 0.51 
Land  endowment  (ha)  3.29 2.65 4.78 2.31 2.52 2.12 1.99 2.82 1.29 1.86 
Land  endowment  p.c.  0.52 0.42 0.72 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.52 0.24 0.37 
Landless dummy (%)  22.28  22.43  18.78  20.30 27.02 23.93 27.16 21.10 23.41 25.03 
Consumption and asset ownership            
Per capita income   1538.62  1915.45  1470.32 1226.49 1424.24 2595.59 2994.16 2125.07 1979.44 3246.56 
Per  capita  consumption  exp.  1305 1506 1200 1058 1362 1561 1803 1526 1287 1579 
Gini (per capita cons. exp.)  0.32  0.30 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.28 
Value  of  all  assets  (Rs.)  17710 24654 17947 10170 14743 47749 66529 43810 29298 48688 
Financial and off-farm (%)  26.69  25.73  29.56 28.30 23.62 23.21 18.56 19.87 25.14 31.66 
Farming and livestock (%)  15.81  16.69  20.67 7.16 10.58  19.86  23.53 26.27  8.08  13.01 
House & cons. durables (%)  57.50  57.58 49.79 64.54 65.79 56.93 57.91 53.86 66.78 55.33 
Gini (all assets per capita)  0.60  0.54 0.56 0.55 0.64 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.54 
Participation in economic activities (%)          
Crop production   70.24  68.57  75.64  71.49 65.07 62.89 67.45 68.41 61.29 53.15 
Livestock production   78.11  81.31  87.35 66.27 70.36 62.85 72.90 66.88 55.16 54.26 
Non-farm self-employment   11.33  10.63 11.16 13.13 11.22 10.96  7.86 10.77  20.73 7.41 
Salaried employment   17.47  24.71  12.65 22.24 14.18 17.27 27.33 13.59 16.22 13.90 
Off-farm wage employment   8.59  5.63 11.10  10.15 7.62 19.96  17.01 18.48 32.36 16.17 
Wage employment   37.59  21.27  39.49 42.69 47.71 43.29 28.27 44.98 53.94 47.05 
No.  of  observation  4980 1279 1613  670  1417 7476 1705 2479 1307 1985 
Source: Own computation from 1982 and 1999 ARIS/REDS surveys.  
All values are in 1982 Rs with 1999 values having been deflated by state level deflators.  
 
  20Table 3: Key household characteristics by rental market participation status in 1982 and 1999 
1982 1999 
   Rent-in  Autarkic  Rent-out Rent-in Autarkic  Rent-out 
Basic Characteristics 
Household size  8.15 6.92 5.34 6.91 6.04 5.54 
Members  aged  below  14  2.75 2.38 1.83 2.38 1.87 1.53 
Members aged 14 – 60  4.90  4.20  3.10  4.17  3.77  3.45 
Members older than 60  0.49 0.34 0.41 0.36 0.40 0.56 
Land endowment (ha)  2.31 3.34 2.93 1.27 2.02 2.87 
Land endowment p.c.  0.28 0.51 0.68 0.20 0.36 0.64 
Landless dummy (%)  11.83  23.76 0.00 37.34  26.29 0.00 
Head's  age  51.85 49.97 51.71 47.41 48.98 51.65 
Female head dummy (%)  2.15 6.67  12.03  3.30 6.54 8.90 
Head with primary or above  (%)  29.03 25.34 35.71 49.50 48.51 61.53 
Agric.  production  profits  (Rs/ha)          
Consumption and asset ownership        
Per capita consumption exp. (Rs.)  1426.98 1280.42 1697.84 1346.19 1549.19 2213.63 
Value  of  all  assets  (Rs)  34783 17215 20333 33839 46568 62466 
Financial and off-farm (%)  19.48 26.47 34.20 19.23 22.69  27.160 
Farming and livestock (%)  32.12 15.70  7.69  21.67 20.91 13.26 
House & cons. durables (%)  48.40  57.83  58.10  59.10  56.41  59.58 
Participation in activities (%)  
Crop production   100.00 72.60  19.17 100.00 66.12  23.07 
Livestock production   97.85 78.66 61.65 81.82 63.57 49.88 
Non-farm self-employment   5.38  11.30  13.91  14.61 9.9 17.96 
Salaried employment   18.28 16.84  28.2  10.71 15.98 30.05 
Wage employment   26.88 38.82 19.92 59.74 44.93 23.94 
Number of observations  93  4621  266  308  6366  802 
Source: Own computation from 1982 and 1999 ARIS/REDS surveys 
All values are in 1982 Rs; 1999 values are deflated by state level deflators. 
 
  21Table 4: Coefficient estimates for the Cobb-Douglass production function  
  OLS 
1982 & 1999 pooled 












































































Observations 5215  5215  8816 
R-squared 0.84  0.76   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; regional dummies 
were included in the OLS regression but not reported. 
  22Table 5: Determinants of land rental market participation  
  Policy measure in the upper/lower bound equations 
  Tenants recognized   Ceiling land redistributed  No. of tenancy laws 
Main equation        






























































































































Lower bound (rent out to autarky) 
















































Upper bound (autarky to rent in) 
















































Observations  11331 5303 11147 5303 11221 5237 
Log likelihood  -4564.94  -1985.13  -4450.96 -1986.69 -4514.77 -1976.77 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constants and regional 
dummies included throughout but not reported.  
 
  23Table 6: Ordered probit regression interacting policy with efficiency measures 
  Policy measure in the upper and lower bound equations 



































































Lower bound (rent out to autarky)       






























Upper bound (autarky to rent in)       






























Observations  5303 5303 5237 
Log  likelihood  -1982.67 -1984.27 -1975.78 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; constants and regional dummies included 
throughout but not reported.  
 
  24Annex 1: Proofs for main propositions 
Proposition 1: The amount of land rented in (out) is strictly increasing (decreasing) in households’ agricultural 
ability αi, and strictly decreasing (increasing) in the land endowment  i A . Rental markets will transfer land to 
efficient, but land-poor producers, thereby contributing to higher levels of productivity and more efficient factor use 
in the overall economy.  
Total differentiation of both sides of (2) with respect to α yields  
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Similarly, total differentiation of both sides of (3) or (4) with respect to α, yields: 
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From (A1), we can obtain  α ∂
∂ a l ; substituting this into (A2) gives, after some manipulation of terms 
  0












a Al a l a l AA
a l a l A a l a Al
A a l a Al a l a l AA
a l a l A a l a Al
f f f
f f f f
f f f f
f f f f A α α α
α
     ( A 3 )    
Thus, for all households who participate on either side of rental markets, area operated increases with ability. The 
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that amount of land rented in (or out) is increasing (deceasing) in agricultural ability.  












, implying the 
amount of land rented in (or out) is strictly decreasing (or increasing) in land endowment.  
Proposition 2: The presence of transaction costs defines two critical ability levels αl(TC
out, ..) and αu(TC
in, ..) such 
that households with ability αi∈[αl; αu] will remain in autarky. Any increase in TC
in or TC
out will expand the autarky 
range, thereby reducing the number of producers participating in rental markets and thus the number of efficiency-
enhancing land transactions. Compared to a situation with no transaction cost, this will decrease productivity and 
social welfare.  
Using the functional form   for the production function, FOC (2-4) can be rewritten as:   2 1 2 1 1 ) , , (
β β β β α α A l A l f a a
− − =
  25            ( A 5 )   w A l p a =
− − − 2 1 1 2 1 1
1
β β β β α β
and for households who rented in:       ( A 6 )  
in
a TC r A l p + =
− − − 1 2 1 2 1 1
2
β β β β α β
for households who rented out:       ( A 7 )  
in
a TC r A l p − =
− − − 1 2 1 2 1 1
2
β β β β α β
Substituting  A A=  into (A5) yields  
1 1
1
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Substituting   and 
*
a a l l = A A=  into (A7) allow us to derive 
2 1 1
1
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Similarly, substituting   and 
*
a a l l = A A =  into (A6) yields 
2 1 1
1

















u  (A10) 
Straightforward differentiation then yields ∂αl/∂TC
out<0 and ∂αu/∂TC
in>0, implying that increased transaction costs 
will reduce the number of producers participating in rental markets and the reverse.  
Proposition 3: Increases of the wage for off-farm employment will increase the amounts of land transacted in rental 
markets by increasing the amount rented out by households with low agricultural ability -who as a consequence will 
join the off-farm labor market- and the amount rented in by those with high-ability who specialize in agricultural 
production. This will be associated with a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate which, in a risk-free environment, 
will make everybody better off.  
First, we consider the case where there is no minimum labor (la

























































β β α r w A       ( A 1 1 ) .  
This implies suggesting that the optimal operational land size is proportional to farming ability. Denoting by Δ the 
second part of this expression allows us to rewrite this as    A
*= αΔ       (A12) 








A n . Substituting this expression back into 
(A12) allows to solve for A
*, and thus for la
*, and r













































































r .  
  26Now assume that all those who optimally would supply a level of farm labor below a critical threshold (la
c) will be 
better off exiting agriculture altogether and renting out all of their land. To solve this problem, note that, due to the 
monotonic relationship between both variables implied by ∂la
*/∂α>0, it will suffice to find the critical level of ability 
αc that corresponds to this threshold so that households with ability α<αc will have la
*<la
c and rent out all their land. 
Setting la
*=la
c and manipulating terms allows us to solve for αc  as 
c
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As, by assumption, only households with α∈[αc, α ] will remain in cultivation, the new market clearing condition 





A n d . Substitution of ac from (A13) into the market clearing condition allows us to obtain an 
expression for the optimal operational land size A
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Setting A
**= A  allows us to solve for the level of ability αau that separates households who rent-in (for αi>αau) from 








































α       ( A 1 5 )  
Noting that the right hand side of (A11) and (A14) will be identical allow us to solve for the new equilibrium rental 
rate r
** which can be explicitly solved for after some manipulation but which we omit for space reasons and since it 
is not particularly informative in our context.  

























of which suggest that, as off-farm opportunities increase a larger number of households will leave agriculture and 
rent out all their land endowment, that households who remain in agricultural production will cultivate more land, 
more households will rent in land, and the equilibrium rental rate will decrease.  
  27Appendix Table 1: Determinants of land rental participation using alternative ability measure  
  Policy measure in the upper/lower bound equations 
  Tenants recognized   Ceiling land redistributed  No. of tenancy laws 
Main equation      


































































Lower bound (rent out to autarky)      
























Upper bound (autarky to rent in)      
























Observations 8820  8820  8711 
Log likelihood  -3513.55  -3501.93  -3436.48 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constants and regional dummies included 
throughout but not reported. As explained in the text, the ability measure used here is derived from the stochastic frontier production function.  
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